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Recent advances in voting theory have shed 
light on the influence of pivotality on voter 
choices when voters have asymmetric private 
information, and the implications of this for 
information aggregation in committees and 
elections. Of particular interest is the result 
that voters may optimally choose to vote con-
trary to their own private information, even in 
committees or elections where all voters share 
the same preferences (David Austen-Smith and 
Jeffrey Banks 1996). A related insight is that 
abstention can occur even when voting is cost-
less, as in the so-called “Swing Voter’s Curse” 
literature (Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang 
Pesendorfer 1996). The reason is that private 
signals give voters information about the mar-
ginal distribution of states (given by voter sig-
nals), but what matters for an optimal decision 
is the distribution of states conditional on a piv-
otal event. For example, the pivotal event under 
majority rule arises when the aggregate votes of 
the other voters is either a tie or one vote away 
from a tie. These conditional distributions can 
be much different from the unconditional dis-
tribution of states. Because of these differences, 
some results are quite unintuitive and seem 
behaviorally implausible at first blush. Because 
these results have important implications about 
information aggregation and the efficiency of 
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election outcomes and committee decisions 
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997, 1999), there 
is a need to test these theories, especially with 
respect to environments where the predictions 
seem implausible.
More generally, the view that voters condi-
tion their choices on pivotality remains contro-
versial, especially among political scientists.1 
Due to many confounding factors, attempts to 
test these theories by empirical study of voter 
behavior have been quite limited. For example, 
a number of researchers have used historical and 
survey data to establish a correlation between 
information and turnout (Palfrey and Keith 
Poole 1987; Thomas Coupe and Abdul Noury 
2004; Matthew Gentzkow 2005, and others), but 
establishing a causal link has been more difficult 
(David Lassen 2005). Moreover, such a relation-
ship might also be consistent with a simpler deci-
sion-theoretic model (John Matsusaka 1995). As 
Lassen specifically points out (p. 116), observa-
tional data are not rich enough in variation, nor 
do they provide researchers with enough con-
trols to evaluate empirically the nuances of the 
pivotal voter approach. The laboratory may be 
the only place where such a study is possible.
This difficulty suggests a valuable role for lab-
oratory experiments, where confounding factors 
can be eliminated and the environment can be 
controlled in order to obtain separation between 
the predictions of equilibrium theories based on 
game theory and pivotality versus nonequilib-
rium theories based on traditional decision the-
ory. A few experimental papers have appeared 
in the literature in the last decade, testing pivotal 
voter models,2 but many open questions remain, 
1 See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro’s (1996) critical 
point of view. Jeffrey Friedman (1996) contains a collec-
tion of articles addressing this controversy, and Feddersen 
(2004) reviews related literature pertaining specifically to 
abstention.
2 See, for example, Serena Guarnaschelli, Richard 
McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000), Battaglini, Morton, and 
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including questions about the generalizability of 
these findings to large elections.
This paper focuses squarely on the question of 
how these findings may change when the num-
ber of voters is scaled up. Because these models 
are intended to apply to both relatively small 
committees and mass elections (and everything 
in between), answering the scaling-up question 
is essential to understanding the general appli-
cability of the theory.
We explore the scaling-up question with 
respect to one specific application of the theory, 
the Swing Voter’s Curse (SVC). The SVC refers 
to a situation in which a voter, conditioning on 
being pivotal, may rationally choose to vote 
against his prior, or may abstain even if his prior 
clearly favors a given alternative. To see why 
this may happen, imagine a situation in which 
alternative a is superior to alternative b, given 
prior information. Assume that most voters 
vote without observing which alternative is ex 
post superior (uninformed voters); some voters, 
however, have access to a private signal which 
reveals the true state (informed voters). In this 
case, it is not possible that the uninformed vot-
ers, following their prior, vote for a. If this were 
the case, an uninformed voter would indeed 
realize that, conditional on being pivotal, some 
votes must be cast by informed voters (or else 
a would win for sure): this uninformed voter 
would not vote for a, because b would certainly 
be a better alternative. As we will illustrate 
below, by a similar argument, uninformed vot-
ers may choose to vote against their prior if they 
know that there are partisan voters who would 
always favor a regardless of the state. In these 
cases, therefore, the way voters make choices 
depends  not only on their preferences and their 
information, but also on the entire distribution 
of preferences and information.
Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007b) pres-
ent the first experimental study of the SVC and 
find significant evidence in support of the theory. 
They consider small committees, and find that 
uninformed swing voters abstain rather than 
cancel out more informed voters, even though 
voting costs are zero. Even more striking, in 
asymmetric environments, where there is parti-
san bias, these uninformed swing voters vote to 
Palfrey (2007a), and Jacob Goeree and Leeat Yariv (2007).
offset these biases, even when their information 
says to vote in the same direction as the bias.
However, the experiments are conducted only 
on small committees of seven swing voters and 
generally six or fewer uninformed voters. In our 
scaled-up elections, we have between two and a 
half and three times as many voters of all kinds 
in each electorate. Other experimental studies 
have reported that voters in larger groups abstain 
with lower frequency than theory would suggest, 
even when the theory is modified to allow for 
some behavioral limitations. For example, David 
Levine and Palfrey (2006), in a study of costly 
voting, find that as they increase the size of the 
voting population, turnout rates are higher than 
the predictions of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, 
and also quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey 
and Palfrey 1995). It may be that as the size of 
the voting population increases, the predictions 
of the SVC find less support in the laboratory if 
swing voters participate more in such larger vot-
ing groups. We find, however,  even in the larger 
voting groups, considerable support for the SVC 
and the pivotal voter theory of information aggre-
gation in committees and elections.
I.  The Model and Equilibrium
We consider a game with a set of N voters 
who deliberate by majority rule. There are two 
alternative policies (or candidates) a, b, and two 
states of the world, A and B. A number m , N 
voters are partisans, who strictly prefer policy 
A regardless of the state. For convenience, we 
assume that m is even, N is odd, and m # N 2 3.3 
The remaining n 5 N 2 m voters are indepen-
dents. These voters share common preferences 
represented by a utility function u 1x, u 2 that is a 
function of the state of the world u [ 5A, B6 and 
the policy x [ 5a, b 6, where u 1a, A2 5 u 1b, B2 
5 1 and u 1a, B2 5 u 1b,     A2 5 0. State A has a 
prior probability p $ 1/2. The true state of the 
world is unknown, but each voter may receive 
an informative signal. We assume that signals of 
different agents are conditionally independent. 
The signal can take three values a,  b, and ø, 
with probabilities
 Pr 1a ZA2 5 Pr 1b ZB2 5 p
 and Pr 1ø ZA2 5 Pr 1ø ZB2 5 1 2 p.
3 These assumptions are made to simplify the notation.
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An independent voter, therefore, is perfectly 
informed on the state of the world with prob-
ability p (i.e., observes a or b) and has no infor-
mation with probability 1 2 p (i.e., observes ø).
After voters have seen their private signal, 
all voters vote simultaneously. Each voter can 
vote for a, vote for b, or abstain (f), and voting 
is costless. Partisans always vote for a. In any 
equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies, 
an independent who receives an a signal votes 
for a, and an independent who receives a b sig-
nal votes for b. Therefore, in this model the only 
strategic voting comes from the uninformed 
independents. Let sa, sb, and sf be the prob-
ability that an uninformed agent votes for a, for 
b, or abstains, respectively. An equilibrium of 
this game is symmetric if agents with the same 
signal use the same strategy: s i 5 s for all i. We 
analyze symmetric equilibria in which agents do 
not use weakly dominated strategies and we will 
refer to them simply as equilibria.
Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007b) 
characterizes the equilibria of the voting game, 
which is unique for the experimental param-
eters. Formal derivations and proofs appear in 
Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007b). First 
consider the benchmark case in which all the 
voters have the same common value, so m 5 
0. For this case, we have, sb 5 0 for all values 
of p. For values of p sufficiently close to 1/2 and 
p sufficiently large, we also have sa 5 0, so all 
uninformed voters abstain. In the experiment, 
we choose parameters such that sa 5 sb 5 0 
when m 5 0.
This equilibrium has a simple interpretation 
as a particular form of the SVC. To see the intu-
ition behind it, suppose the prior is p 5 1/2. If an 
uninformed voter were to choose in isolation, he 
would be indifferent between the two options, 
a or b. When voting in a group, however, he 
knows that with positive probability some other 
voter is informed. By voting, he risks voting 
against this more informed voter. So, since 
he has the same preferences as this informed 
voter and he is otherwise indifferent among the 
alternatives because he has no private informa-
tion on the state, he always finds it optimal to 
abstain. When the prior is p . 1/2, the problem 
of the voter is more complicated. In this case the 
swing voter’s curse is mitigated by the fact that 
the prior favors one of the two alternatives. As 
before, the voter does not want to vote against 
an informed voter. He is not sure, however, that 
there is an informed voter: and if no informed 
voter is voting, he strictly prefers alternative a 
since this is ex ante more likely. Thus, although 
the voter never finds it optimal to vote for b, he 
may find it optimal to vote for a. The higher is 
p, the higher is the incentive to vote for a; the 
higher is p (i.e., the probability that there are 
other informed voters), the lower is the incen-
tive to vote. For any p, if p . 1/2 is not too high, 
the voter abstains.
A. Partisan Bias
If m . 0, the analysis is more subtle. Now, 
uninformed voters always have an incentive to 
vote to balance out the partisans, who (from 
the standpoint of an independent) bias the out-
come in favor of a. The calculus now depends 
critically on the conditional state probabilities 
if there is a tie. For example, if there is a tie, 
it means some of the independent voters have 
voted for b. Hence, in any equilibrium, sb . 0: 
i.e., uninformed voters must be voting for b with 
positive probability. To see the logic, suppose 
not, so sb 5 0. This implies that if a pivotal 
event occurs, it must be that all the b voters are 
informed independents, and hence the state is B. 
Therefore, the best response is sB 5 1, a contra-
diction. In addition, it is easy to show that there 
cannot be an equilibrium.
As in the case with m 5 0, if p 5 1/2 or if 
p . 1/2 and p is sufficiently large, then sa 5 0. 
The only equilibrium involves mixing between 
b and abstention, so the equilibrium is charac-
terized by a single number, sb [ 10, 14 . In our 
experiment, we choose parameters such that sb 
[ 10, 12 , and sa 5 0.
There are several comparative static proper-
ties of the parameters of the model, m, p, n, p. 
For example, the higher is the bias in favor of A, 
the higher is sb.
II.  Experimental Design
We use controlled laboratory experiments 
to evaluate the theoretical predictions. Once a 
specific parametrization for n, m, p, and p is 
chosen, the model described and solved in the 
previous section can be directly tested in the 
lab without changes. In all of the sessions of 
the experiment, we used p 5 0.25. We had two 
sessions each of two different treatments for 
the probability distribution of the state of the 
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world: p 5 1/2 and p 5 5/9. Within each session 
subjects participated in three different treat-
ments for partisan bias: m 5 0, 6, and 12. The 
number of independents was 21 in three of the 
sessions and 17 in one session 1with p 5 1/22 .
The symmetric undominated Bayesian equi-
librium is unique for all parameter values used 
in the experiment. For all elections, sa 5 0. For 
all m 5 0 elections, sf 5 1. For all elections 
with m . 0, sb [ 10, 12 . Specifically, the equi-
librium predictions are: sb 1p 5 1/2; m 5 6; n 
5 212 5 0.33; sb 1p 5 1/2; m 5 12 ; n 5 212 5 
0.69; sb 1p 5 1/2; m 5 6; n 5 172 5 0.42; sb 1p 
5 1/2; m 5 12; n 5 172 5 0.88; sb 1p 5 5/9; m 5 
6; n 5 212 5 0.32; and sb 1p 5 5/9; m 5 12; n 5 
212 5 0.69. We contrast these with the decision 
theoretic predictions, based on naïve voting, as, 
for example, in Matsusaka (1995). According to 
the naïve model, voters abstain unless there are 
consumption benefits to voting, and these con-
sumption benefits are independent of pivot prob-
abilities. The consumption benefits are derived 
from voting for a choice that yields the highest 
utility given their prior beliefs about the state. 
In our experiment, the predictions of that model 
are: sf 5 1 for p 5 1/2; and sa . sb 5 0 for p 5 
5/9. Moreover, since voters are not strategic, sa is 
independent from the number of partisans m.
The experiments were all conducted at the 
Center for Experimental Social Science at New 
York University and used registered students 
from New York University.4 Four sessions were 
conducted—three with 22 subjects and one with 
18 subjects.5 No subject participated in more 
than one session. Each session had three sub-
sessions, each lasting ten elections. All subses-
sions used the same p, but different values of 
m 5 0, 6, and 12. We varied the sequence of 
m across sessions to control partially for any 
sequencing or learning effects. That is, for each 
value of p, we conducted one session using the 
order 112, 6, 02 and one session using the order 10, 6, 122 . In the analysis that follows, we label 
the first variation Partisans first variation and 
the second Partisans Last variation. In the two 
Partisans Last sessions and the Partisan First 
4 The instructional and payment procedures are the same 
as described in Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007).
5 We planned four 22-subject sessions, but were 4 sub-
jects short in one of the sessions. In each session, one sub-
ject was paid $20 to serve as a monitor. Partisan voters were 
computerized.
session with p 5 5/9, n 5 21, but in the Partisan 
First session with p 5 0.5, n 5 17. We discuss 
the implications of this difference below.
III.  Experimental Results
A. Aggregate Voter Choices
Informed Voters.—Of the 2,400 voting deci-
sions we observed, in 618 cases (26 percent) 
subjects were informed, that is, revealed a red 
or yellow ball. Across all treatments and ses-
sions, these informed voters chose 99 percent 
as predicted; 99.7 percent of the time if a voter 
revealed a red ball, he or she voted for jar 1 (state 
A) and 98 percent of the time if a voter revealed 
a yellow ball, he or she voted for jar 2 (state B). 
We interpret this as indicating that subjects had 
a least a basic comprehension of the task.
Uninformed Voters: Effects of treatments 
on Voter Choices.—Table 1 summarizes the 
choices of uninformed voters as compared to 
the equilibrium predictions. In all treatments, 
we find that uninformed voters abstain in large 
percentages compared to informed voters, and 
these differences are significant. We also find 
strong evidence that the majority of uninformed 
voters alter their voting choices as predicted by 
the SVC theory and contrary to the decision-
theoretic theory. When m 5 0, uninformed vot-
ers abstain in high percentages. However, with 
partisan bias, uninformed voters reduce absten-
tion and increase their probability of voting for 
b. The changes are all statistically significant.6
session, Ordering, and Learning Effects.—
Figure 1 presents the average choices of unin-
formed voters over time by session. First observe 
that there are sharp changes in behavior imme-
diately following a change in partisan bias, as 
shown in Table 1. Second, there appear to be 
some differences related to the order of variation 
in partisans when p 5 1/2: the probability of vot-
ing for b is lower in the Partisans First treatment 
than in the Partisans Last treatment for all val-
ues of m. However, this difference is significant 
6 The t-statistics are 12.64 and 4.19, respectively, for the 
case when p 5 1/2 and 9.82 and 9.12, respectively, for the 
case when p 5 5/9. 
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only when m 5 6 and m 5 12.7 This difference 
is expected since in the Partisans First treat-
ment there were fewer voters, n 5 17, compared 
to n 5 21 in the Partisans Last session, so the 
predicted probability of voting for b in the n 
5 17 session is greater, and this is reflected in 
the data. We also find differences between the 
two sessions when p 5 5/9. In particular, we 
see more voting in the Partisans Last variation 
than in the Partisans First variation. When m 
7 The t-statistics are 0.62, 2.09, and 5.12 for m 5 0, 6, 
and 12, respectively.
5 0, uninformed voters are significantly more 
likely to vote for b in the Partisans Last treat-
ment than in the Partisans First treatment.8 
Furthermore, when m 5 0 and 6, uninformed 
voters are significantly more likely to vote for 
a in the Partisans Last variation. These differ-
ences appear to reflect differences in ordering 
of the treatments.9
8 The t-statistic is 1.92.
9 The t-statistics are 5.33 and 1.85 for m 5 0 and 6, 
respectively.
Table 1—Vote Percentages by Uninformed Voters 
(Predicted percentages in parentheses)
m Observations a b Abstain
p 5 1/2, n 5 17 0 135 6 (0) 7 (0) 87 (100)
6 120 4 (0) 55 (42) 41 (58)
12 127 10 (0) 76 (86) 13 (17)
p 5 1/2, n 5 21 0 151 9 (0) 9 (0) 83 (100)
6 158 20 (0) 42 (33) 38 (67)
12 163 21 (0) 48 (69) 31 (31)
p 5 5/9, n 5 21 0 304 10 (0) 2 (0) 88 (100)
6 311 11 (0) 35 (32) 54 (68)
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B. Efficiency of Choices
Our analysis of voting behavior provides sup-
port for the SVC, but also shows that some unin-
formed voters vote for a. This deviation from 
optimal behavior should have the consequence 
of leading to less efficient choices for the group. 
We find that this is indeed the case when there 
are partisan voters, and for the treatment when 
p 5 1/2 where n 5 17 for half of the observations. 
However, when there are zero partisans, we find 
that 100 percent of the time when p 5 1/2, and 
98 percent of the time when p 5 5/9, the group’s 
choice is the correct one. When m 5 6 and p 5 
1/2, however, the group’s choice is correct only 69 
percent of the time. This increases to 93 percent 
of the time when m 5 6 and p 5 5/9, a differ-
ence which is significant at the 10 percent level. 
We find similar results for the comparison with 
m 5 12; when p 5 1/2, the group is correct only 
39 percent of the time, while when p 5 5/9, the 
group’s choice is correct 69 percent of the time, 
a difference that is significant at the 10 percent 
level as well.
Table 2 summarizes the mean efficiency 
results by the state of the world and treatment 
(with ties coded as 0.5) with the mean predicted 
efficiency given the number of informed voters 
in each period and predicted voting behavior.
IV.  Concluding Remarks
The central finding from this study is that 
most of the predictions of Swing Voter’s Curse 
theory hold up in large elections conducted 
under controlled laboratory conditions. There is 
significant abstention, and significant balancing 
of partisans by uniformed voters; and vote bal-
ancing increases with the partisan imbalance. 
Elections with no partisan imbalance success-
fully aggregate information and lead to efficient 
outcomes. Consistent with SVC theory, this effi-
ciency falls off as partisan imbalance increases, 
but to a significantly greater extent than is pre-
dicted in equilibrium.
It is instructive to compare these findings in 
large elections with results from the smaller 
elections reported in Battaglini, Morton, and 
Palfrey (2007b). All the qualitative results con-
cerning the comparative statics, balancing, and 
abstention are the same. One slight difference is 
that there is less voting for a in the small elec-
tions than in the large elections, except for the 
p 5 5/9 m 5 0 treatment, where we observed 
20 percent voting for a in the small elections, 
compared with 10 percent voting for a in the 
large elections. These differences were reflected 
in slightly different efficiency results between 
small and large elections, with the comparisons 
mirroring the differences in voting for a: more 
(irrational) a voting results in lower efficiency.
We conclude that this scaled-up study suc-
cessfully replicates the initial swing voter’s curse 
experiment reported in Battaglini, Morton, and 
Palfrey (2007b), obtaining very similar find-
ings in laboratory committees that are three 
times the size of those in the original study. The 
one caveat is that we found evidence of a slight 
increase in irrational nonequilibrium behavior 
(voting for a) in the larger elections. Whether 
this trend would continue as election size is fur-
ther scaled up is an open question.
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